Risk, variety and volatility: growth, innovation and stock prices in early industry evolution by Mazzucato, Mariana
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Risk, variety and volatility: growth, innovation and
stock prices in early industry evolution
Journal Item
How to cite:
Mazzucato, Mariana (2003). Risk, variety and volatility: growth, innovation and stock prices in early industry
evolution. Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 13(5) pp. 491–512.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© [not recorded]
Version: [not recorded]
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1007/s00191-003-0167-7
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright







Risk, Variety and Volatility:  









This is an author-produced version of a paper published in the Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, Vol. 13 (5): 491-512. This version has been peer-reviewed, 
but does not include the final publisher proof corrections, published layout, or 






The paper studies the patterns of volatility in firm-specific growth rates and stock 
prices during the early phase of the life-cycle of an old economy industry, 
the US automobile industry from 1900-1930,  and a new economy industry, the US 
PC industry from 1974-2000.  Strikingly similar patterns of volatility are discovered 
in the early phases of the two industries. The comparison sheds light on the co-
evolution of industrial and financial volatility and the relationship between this co-
evolution and mechanisms of Schumpetarian creative destruction.  Results also 
provide insight into the debate on whether firm growth rates follow a random walk 
(e.g. Gibrat’s Law).  
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The paper studies the patterns of volatility in firm-specific growth rates and 
stock prices during the early phase of the life-cycle of an old economy industry, 
the US automobile industry from 1900-1930,  and a new economy industry, the US 
PC industry from 1974-2000.  The comparison sheds light on the co-evolution of 
industrial and financial volatility and the relationship between this co-evolution and 
mechanisms of Schumpetarian creative destruction.  It also illustrates the strikingly 
similar patterns of volatility in the early phases of old and new industries—suggesting 
that some of the patterns that are associated with the “new economy” are simply 
patterns that relate to early industry evolution in an economy with many new 
industries.  
 
After reviewing data sources in Section II, Section III studies industrial 
volatility in both industries by focusing on the statistical properties of firm-level 
growth rates.  Both absolute and relative growth rates are explored, with the latter 
being more central to an evolutionary analysis of change. Descriptive statistics and 
unit root tests are performed on the growth rates where the null hypothesis for the 
latter is that firm growth rates follow a random walk.  In Section IV, these same 
statistical methods are used to study the volatility of firm-level stock prices and 
dividends.  Results indicate that, for most firms, stock prices are the most volatile 
during the same decades in which relative growth rates (e.g. market shares) are the 
most volatile. In Section V, innovation dynamics in the two industries are used to 
interpret these patterns of volatility: in both industries the decades in which relative 
growth rates and stock prices were the most volatile were the same decades in which 
innovation was the most radical and competence-destroying (Tushman and Anderson, 
1986). Building on this result, Section VI uses panel data analysis to test whether firm 
level stock prices are related to variables describing industrial instability (as opposed 
to traditional fundamentals), and whether this relationship is stronger in the early or 
mature phase of the industry life-cycle.  The firm-level results confirm the industry 
level results in Mazzucato (2002) where changes in industry structure (e.g. number of 
firms, entry/exit rates, concentration, etc.) and innovation are related to changes in 





II. Data  
The study focuses on the US market for automobiles and personal computers 
(including both domestic and foreign producers).  The firm-level and industry-level 
data is annual. Sales are measured in terms of annual units of automobiles (cars and 
trucks) and personal computers (all microcomputers, e.g. desktops and notebooks) 
produced.  In both industries, units produced follow the same general qualitative 
dynamic as that of net sales in dollars but is preferred due to its greater precision 
(sales figures are affected by idiosyncratic accounting items).  
 
Automobiles: Individual firm units and total industry units from 1904-1999 
were collected from annual editions of Wards Automotive Yearbooks (first editions, 
reporting data starting in 1904, are published in 1924).  Although firm-level units 
were collected for only 8 domestic firms and 5 foreign firms (the first foreign firms 
entered in 1965), the total industry sales include the units shipped by all existing firms 
(e.g. in 1909 that includes the output of 271 firms).  Firm-specific stock prices, 
dividends, and earnings/share figures were collected from annual editions of Moody’s 
Industrial Manual.  Industry-specific per share data were collected from the Standard 
and Poor’s Analyst Handbooki (the firms included to calculate that index are listed in 
the footnote below).  However, since all financial data, except stock prices, only goes 
back to 1946 for the automobile industry, the data for the pre-war period was 
aggregated from the firm-specific data gathered from Moody’sii.  The first year the 
auto firms went public was 1918, with Ford following only in 1956 (see footnote i for 
exact dates for each firm).  
 
PCs:   Annual firm-level data on the total number of personal computers 
produced from 1973-2000 was obtained from the International Data Corporation 
(IDC), a market research firm in Framingham, Massachusetts.  Although this database 
is very rich (including brand, form factor, processor speed, region and customer 
segment), for the purpose of this study firm-level units were aggregated across models 
and brands produced by the firm.  Firm-level stock price, dividend, and earnings per 
share data were obtained from Compustat. Industry-level financial variables were 
obtained, as for the post-war auto industry, from the Standard and Poor’s Analyst’s 
Handbook (2000).  The firms which define this index are all included in the firm-level 
analysis, except for Silicon Graphics and Sun Microsystems (the only two firms in the 
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S&P computer index which don’t produce personal computers)iii. Hedonic prices were 
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  An index measuring quality 
improvements was obtained from Filson (2001).     
 
 The data is analyzed during the first 30 years of each industry’s history. This 
represents the “early” phase in the industry life-cycle, i.e. the phase that encompasses 
the introductory phase when the product first emerges and the initial growth phase 
(Gort and Klepper, 1982).  The data for the “mature” phase of the automobile 
industry’s life-cycle is also analyzed to gather some insight into what might lie ahead 
for the PC industry. The depression years, 1929-1933, are omitted from the sample 
(although results for relative growth rates are not altered when these years are 
included). To control for movements in the general market, analysis was also done on 
the units data divided by GDP and on the financial data divided by the S&P500 
equivalent (e.g. GM stock price divided by the S&P500 stock price). 
 
III. Firm Growth Rates 
When studying the statistical properties of firm growth, the “law of 
proportionate effect”, or Gibrat’s law, is often used.  Gibrat’s Law of Proportionate 
Growth, states that firm growth rates are i.i.d. random variables independent of  firm 
size (Gibrat, 1931; Ijiri and Simon, 1977). The size of a firm at time t+1 is taken to be 
a function of its size at time t subject to random variation.  Taking xi to denote firm 
size, the size of firm i is governed by the following equation:  
x t x t ti i i i( ) ( ) ( )= + − +α β ε1           (1) 
where x ti ( )  is the log size of firm i at time t, and α is a growth component common 
to all firms.  Gibrat’s law assumes that ε is an i.i.d random variable and for all i, 
andβ i =1 (i.e. that the expected rate of growth is independent of the present size).  The 
principal result in such models is that although firms might begin ex-ante with equal 
growth prospects, differences in initial conditions and the presence of random events 
cause firms to soon diverge in size and market shares, causing a skewed size-
distribution (log-normal) to emerge. The empirical evidence on Gibrat's Law is 
mixed, with some studies showing that growth rates and their variance tend to fall 
with size and age (Hall, 1987; Evans, 1987) and others which find evidence for the 
law by focusing on the large percentage of exits.  Geroski and Machin (1993) claim 
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that Gibrat's Law is better suited to describe the growth process of relatively large 
firmsiv.  
 
Gibrat’s law is difficult to reconcile with those studies which find that there 
are persistent and cumulative patterns in firm profits and innovation (Mueller, 1990).  
While the random story suggests that there is some kind of reversion to the mean, the 
persistence story suggests that there are strong positive feedback mechanisms at work.  
Positive feedback may arise from learning by doing in which firm growth depends on 
cumulative output, or from more complex reasons related to the dynamics of 
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), and the way that firm-specific 
capabilities develop (Teece, Pisano and Shuen 1990).  Geroski and Mazzucato (2002) 
find that Gibrat’s law is better suited to describe firm growth during the early phase of 
the industry life-cycle when technological opportunity is greater and concentration is 
lower.  This result is returned to in the discussion of the results below.  
 
Gibrat’s law can be tested for in various ways.  As is well known, testing for 
the beta coefficient in Equation (1) contains a bias towards accepting the random walk 
hypothesis (Geroski and Mazzucato 2002).  Testing for a unit root (for each firm), 
using different variations of the Dickey-Fuller method (Dickey and Fuller, 1979), can 
provide an alternative way to test for the random walk hypothesis.  If a time-series has 
a unit root then it shows a systematic pattern in its movement (a stochastic trend), but 
such movement isn’t predictable because it is the effect of random shocks on a long-
memory process.  Dickey-Fuller testing strategies are generally addressed for 
discriminating between the trend-stationary processes and the difference-stationary 
processes.  They can be modeled in many ways, depending on the consideration of 
drifts (deterministic component), trends, and the number of augments of the lagged 
dependent variable (ADF: Augmented D-F tests).  It has been observed that the size 
and power properties of the ADF test are sensitive to the number of lags (Agiakoglou 
and Newbold 1992). There are two main approaches: 1) the general to specific 
technique (Hall 1994) which starts with a large number of lagged terms which are 
iteratively reduced until a significant statistic is encountered, and 2) the model 
selection information criteria (Akaike Information Criterion - AIC and the Schwarz 
Bayesian Information Criterion –SBC).  Information Criterion methods based on 
small values can, in the presence of  MA errors,  result in size distortions (Maddala 
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1998).  General to specific approaches tend to define higher dimensions, but this can 
produce important losses of power, especially in small sample sizes.  The large (and 
increasing) number of unit root tests is a consequence of the fact that there is no 
uniformly powerful test of the unit root hypothesis.  Given the moderate sample 
dimensions in the data used here, the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBC) 
is used to handle the tradeoff between fit and parsimony.  
 
Results:  Tables 1-4 contain the standard deviations, means and unit root tests 
on firm-level and industry-level units and market shares, where the latter are taken as 
proxies of relative growth rates (results for firm level growth rates divided by industry 
growth rates were qualitatively the same as those for market shares).  To maximize 
the degrees of freedom, the unit root tests were done on the entire 30 years of the 
“early” phase of industry history (or the maximum number of years that the firm 
existed), while the descriptive statistics were (also) done on the three individual 
decades (as well as the entire pre-war and post-war periods). When unit root tests 
identified a trend, the descriptive statistics were also performed on the detrended data.  
But since no qualitative difference was found in the different periods between the 
detrended and the non-detrended series (after the logs and differences were taken), for 
purposes of consistency, statistics only for the non-detrended data is reported here.  
Data is presented for the top 8 firms in the automobile industry: GM, Ford, Chrysler, 
American Motors, Studebaker, Packard, Hudson, and Nash (with unit root tests also 
presented for the foreign firms), and the top 10 firms in the PC industry: Apple, 
Compaq, Dell, Everex, Gateway, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, NEC, Toshiba, and Unisys  
 
Automobiles. Table 1 indicates that firm-level units contain a unit root only in 
the pre-war period, i.e. they follow an I(1) process in the pre-war and an I(0) process 
in the post-war period.  This is true for all firms except for Ford which does not 
contain a unit root in either period, most likely due to its stable dominance of the 
industry in the pre-war period (and the general stability of the industry in the post-war 
period). The same result holds for relative growth rates (market shares) and whether 
or not auto units were divided by GDP.  As regards the different decades, Table 2 
indicates that firm-level and industry-level units were most volatile in the period 
1918-1941, with most volatility occurring between 1918-1928.  Studebaker was the 
only exception, with its most volatile period after World War 2.  
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Personal Computers.  Table 3 indicates that the growth rates of all firms, 
except Apple and Dell, contain a unit root.  The descriptive statistics in Table 4 
indicate that all firms experienced higher mean growth in the most recent decade 
(1990-2000) but more volatile growth (standard deviation) in the first decade (1970-
1980) or the second decade (1980-90).  Relative growth, unlike absolute growth, was 
the most volatile in the last decade.  The industry results diverge from the firm-level 
results, suggesting an aggregation problem: total units experienced both higher 
average growth and more volatile growth in the first decade 1970-80.  This is most 
likely because in some years the aggregation may dampen inter-firm heterogeneity 
and volatility while in other years it may enhance it, depending on how the different 
series interact. Nevertheless, it appears clear in both the firm-level and industry-level 
data that the last decade was the least volatile in terms of absolute growth but the most 
volatile in terms of relative growth and market shares.  
 
Hence, Tables 1-4 indicate that the first 30 years in the auto and PC industry 
were characterized by volatile growth rates.  The auto industry experienced the most 
volatile growth, in both absolute and relative terms in the first decade of its existence, 
while the PC industry experienced the most volatile absolute growth in the first 
decade (when entry rates were highest) and the most volatile relative growth in the 
third decade.  After looking at the statistical properties of stock prices, Section III will 
interpret these results in terms of innovation dynamics in both industries.  
  
IV. Stock Price Volatility  
In this section the volatility of growth rates is compared with the volatility of 
stock prices.  Research into this question can benefit by linking two literatures that do 
not often talk to each other: the (dynamic) industrial organization literature that looks 
at factors that determine industrial instability, for example the rise and fall of firm 
numbers and market share instability (Hymer and Pashigian, 1962; Gort and Klepper, 
1982), and the finance literature that looks at the factors that determine stock price 
volatility (Shiller, 1989; Braun et al. 1995, Campbell et al. 2000).  The connection 
between the two literatures lies in how “risk” and uncertainty evolve over the industry 
life-cycle—i.e. the dynamics of a time-varying (industry) risk premium—and how 
this risk is both a cause and an effect of the mechanisms that create differences and 
inequality between firms. The presence of uncertainty is what generates opportunities 
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for firms to differentiate themselves while the resulting inter-firm differences result in 
a riskier more uncertain environment (for the individual firm and for a potential 
investor).  It is this non-linearity that led the pioneer of the economics of risk to state: 
“Without uncertainty it is doubtful whether intelligence itself would exist.” (Knight, 
1921, p. 268).  
 
Tables 5-12 contain the standard deviations, means and unit root tests on firm-
level and industry-level stock prices and dividends.  Results are also included for the 
aggregate industry data, i.e. the average industry stock price and dividend per share 
computed by the S&P Analyst Handbook.    To control for movements in the general 
market, analysis was also done on the firm-level data divided by the S&P500 
equivalent.  The results for these deflated (by the S&P500) values are found in italics.  
However, in both industries no qualitative differences were found between results for 
units that were not deflated and those that were.  
 
Automobiles. The results in Tables 6, and 10 indicate that firm-level and 
industry-level stock prices and dividends were the most volatile precisely in the same 
period that units and market shares were: the period 1918-1941, with most volatility 
of stock prices occurring between 1918-1928 and the most volatility of dividends in 
the period 1933-1941 (units were even more volatile in the period preceding 1918 but 
firms were not quoted on the stock market yet).  This holds for all the firms, except 
for Studebaker which instead experienced more volatility of both units and stock 
prices in the post-war period (1948-1970) but more volatility of dividends in the pre-
war period. Division by the S&P 500 indices does not alter any of the qualitative 
results between the two periods (i.e. the earlier period is still much more volatile), 
except again in the case of Studebaker, whose dividends were more volatile in the 
post-war period when divided by the S&P500 and vice versa when not divided.   
 
Whereas Table 2 indicates that firm-level units and market shares follow an 
I(1) process in the pre-war and an I(0) process in the post-war period, most of the 
stock prices and dividends follow an I(1) process in both periods (as does the S&P500 
stock price index as well).  This suggests the possible presence of “excess volatility” 
in both periods: that stock prices are much more volatile than the underlying 
fundamentals. However, using the efficient market model as a benchmark against 
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which to compare the volatility of actual stock prices, Mazzucato and Semmler (1999) 
and Mazzucato (2002) find that degree of excess volatility was highest during the 
early stage of the auto industry.  
 
Table 6 indicates that the average relative automobile stock (i.e. the average 
auto industry stock price divided by the S&P500 stock price) grew much less than the 
economy average in the post-war period. This is also the period when the average 
industry sales growth began to fall (the mean growth rate both at the firm and industry 
level is negative after 1970).  As regards the last three decades, stock prices—like 
units and market shares—were most volatile in the decade1970-1980 than the 
following two decades.  
  
Personal Computers.  
Table 7 indicates that all firm stock prices, except for Unisys and Gateway, 
contained a unit root, consistent with Shiller’s finding that stock prices tend to move 
like a random walk (Shiller, 1989).  Table 8 illustrates that in the PC industry, firm 
and industry stock prices were most volatile in the last decade (especially in the early 
1990’s). However, since at the industry level dividends were the most volatile in the 
last decade (not true for several firms), this does not mean that there is more “excess 
volatility”.  Stock prices were the most volatile in the same decade that relative 
growth rates were the most volatile.  Units instead were the most volatile in the first 
decade when entry rates into the industry were highest (Mazzucato, 2002).   
 
V. Innovation   
Table13 summarizes the above results using aggregate volatility figures: 
market share instability (as defined in Hymer and Pashigian, 1962)v, the standard 
deviation of the growth of total units, the standard deviation of the growth of stock 
prices and dividends, and the latter two divided by the S&P 500 equivalents.  It is 
clear that in both industries stock prices were the most volatile in the period when 
market share instability was the highest. This section documents (qualitatively) that in  
both industries this was also the period in which innovation was the most radical, i.e. 
had a greatest impact on the production process.   
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In the auto industry, the period in which growth rates and stock prices were 
the most volatile was also the period in which entry rates were the highest, and 
technological change was the most radical.  In an early work, Epstein (1928) 
attributed the large change in firm numbers, entry/exit patters and the fall in prices to 
technological change.  Abernathy et al. (1983) confirms this point by documenting 
(through an in depth innovation survey where each innovation is weighted by its 
impact on production) that the innovations that impacted the production process the 
most in the auto industry all occurred before 1935!  Falling prices were caused by 
changes in technology, the diffusion of mass production, and the general expansion of 
the market.  Between 1906 and 1940 the real price of automobiles fell by 51% and 
given that the CPI at the same time rose by 59%, the inflation adjusted prices dropped 
almost 70% (Raff and Trajtenberg, 1997, p. 77).  Using the hedonic price index that 
they created, Raff and Trajtenberg (1997) illustrate that most of the real change in 
automobile prices between 1906-1982 occurred between 1906-1940, and within that 
period most of the change occurred between 1906-1918.  Between 1906-1940 hedonic 
prices fell at an average annual rate of 5%. Filson’s (2001) “quality change” index—
derived by dividing the BEA actual price index by the hedonic price index created by 
Raff and Trajetenberg (1997)— confirms these results indicating that most of the 
percentage change in quality occurred between 1895-1908 (25% annual rate of 
change compared to 3.1% in the period 1909-1922 and 3.2% in the period 1923-
1929).  
 
Unlike in the auto industry, in the PC industry the period of initial market 
expansion and high entry rates (causing high absolute growth rates), was not the 
period with the most radical technological change.  Entry/exit rates were highest in 
the first decade, 1974-1984, but it took almost two decades for new firms to challenge 
the main industry leader, IBM, and hence to challenge the status quo both in terms of 
technology and market shares (causing high relative growth rates).  Whereas the 
innovations introduced in the 1970’s and 1980’s were controlled by IBM (since 
everything had to be IBM compatible), the quality changes in the 1990’s disrupted the 
status quo, principally because power shifted from IBM to Microsoft and Intel 
(Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1997)vi.  Filson’s (2001) “quality change” index indicates 
that most of the percentage change in the personal computer industry occurred in the 
first and third stage: 34% between 1975-1986 (the years when the industry first 
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emerged encompassing the introduction of Intel’s 386 processor), and 38% in the 
period 1993-1999 (soon after Windows 3.0 was introduced), with only 17% in the 
middle stage.  Hence the last decade in the PC industry has witnessed not only the 
most quality change but also the most volatility in market shares. The uncertainty 
caused by the changing technology and market shares caused stock prices to be most 
volatile in the period 1994-2000, precisely the period referred to as the “new 
economy”.   
 
As in autos, prices of personal computers were driven by technological 
advance. Prices began to drop significantly after Intel’s introduction the 32-bit 386 
processors in 1985 and the introduction of Windows 3.0 in 1990.  The latter allowed 
the production of PCs to be standardized and “commoditized” (via cloning of the IBM 
PC).  The rise of the internet also has increased sales and decreased prices.  In recent 
years quality-adjusted prices have fallen at an average annual rate of 24% (BEA, 
Survey of Current Business, 2000). Berndt and Rappaport (2000) find that between 
1983-89 PC prices fell by an average of 18%, between 1989-94 by 32%, and between 
1994 and 99 by 40%. 
 
Hence in both the auto and PC industry, relative growth rates and stock prices 
were the most volatile in the period in which technological change was the most 
radical. While in the auto industry this occurred in the very early years of industry 
evolution (hence coinciding with the period of high absolute growth rates), in the PC 
industry it had to wait almost two decades until the new entrants broke their chain of 
dependence on IBM.  
 
VI. Panel Data Analysis: Inter-Firm Heterogeneity 
To better understand the degree to which stock price dynamics follow the 
patterns of industrial instability, panel data analysis is used here to regress the rate of 
change of firm stock prices on life-cycle variables like changes in: firm numbers, 
market share instability, market concentration, and also on more traditional 
fundamentals at both the firm, industry and economy wide level (e.g. firm dividends, 
industry dividends, S&P 500 stock price, etc.). Given the results already obtained, the 
goal is to see whether in the early phase of industry evolution stock prices are more 
related to variables defining industrial instability than they are to variables in the 
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mature phase, and whether in the mature phase they react more to changes in 
fundamentals than they do in the early phase.     
 
Due to the low number of firms and the long time period, Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression estimations (SURE) are used (Zellner, 1962, Smith, 2000). 
Wald tests are used to test for inter-firm heterogeneity, both in terms of the 
differences between firms with respect to a single regressor (Wald test type 1) and the 
differences between firm-specific coefficients for all the single regressors (Wald test 
type 2).  That is, it tests for joint restrictions for homogeneity (the Fixed Effect 
hypothesis).  If the null hypothesis of homogeneity is rejected then the correct 
estimator is the Unrestricted SURE (which controls for the likelihood ratio test 
between the sum of the OLS equations).  If instead the hypothesis of homogeneity 
cannot be rejected on the whole set of parameters and it is not possible to reject the 
restrictions for homogeneity of the firm-specific coefficients for the single regressors, 
then this means that the correct estimator is the Restricted SURE.   
 
Firm-level stock prices were regressed on firm-level dividends, firm market 
share, the S&P500 index stock price, the S&P500 index dividends, the number of 
firms in the industry and the level of concentration. Other variables were also 
included but since no convergence occurred of the Maximum Likelihood (ML) 
algorithm, they had to be omitted. For reasons of convergence, multicollinearity and 
parsimony, different specifications were tried for the PC industry, where each 
specification includes a different sub-set of firms. The t-statistics in the SURE 
analysis are often very large due to the convergence procedure.  Due to space 
limitation, only the tables for the restricted case are included below, the unrestricted 
case which requires comparison with single equation OLS estimates are treated 
verbally.   
 
Automobiles (1918-1941, 1948-2000).  In Table 14-15 Wald tests state that in 
the pre-war period the joint restrictions for homogeneity (the Fixed Effect hypothesis) 
and the restrictions of the firm-specific coefficients for the single regressors can both 
be rejected. In the post-war period we cannot reject this restriction on the whole set of 
parameters and we can also not reject the restrictions for homogeneity of the firm-
specific coefficients for all the single regressors. This means that in the post-war 
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period there is more homogeneity between firms in how stock prices are affected by 
the different variables. In the pre-war period, the rate of change of firm stock prices 
are significantly affected by changes in market shares, the number of firms and the 
herfindahl index.  Neither the firm level, industry level not market level fundamentals 
seem to be significant in this early period.   In the post-war period there is increased 
significance of the fundamentals (both at the firm level and at the general market 
level) and no significance of the industrial dynamics variables (market shares, number 
of firms and herfindahl index).  
 
Personal Computers (1975-1999).  In each of the different specifications, the 
results were similar to that which emerged in the pre-war period for automobiles: 
rejection of the joint restrictions for homogeneity of the whole set of parameters 
(Fixed Effect panel hypothesis) and non-rejection of the restriction for homogeneity 
of the firm-specific coefficients for most of the single regressors.  This means that the 
correct estimator is the partially restricted SURE estimator (only for homogeneity on 
those regressors for which restriction on homogeneity was rejected).  As in the pre-
war auto industry, the most significant variables in this early stage of evolution are 
changes in market shares, the number of firms and the herfindhal index.  The financial 
fundamentals both at the level of the firm and at the level of the general market were 
less significant.  
 
These results indicate that in both industries stock price dynamics in the early 
phase of the industry life-cycle are affected significantly by the turbulence in market 
structure: changing number of firms, rising concentration and market share dynamics. 
On the other hand, firm level and market level fundamentals (dividends, earnings per 
share) have a greater effect on stock price dynamics in the mature phase than in the 
early phase.  Furthermore, in the early phase of both industries it is easier to reject the 
joint restrictions for homogeneity of the whole set of parameters, indicating that in 
this phase, unlike in the mature phase (for automobiles at least), there is more 
heterogeneity between firms. The fact that there is more heterogeneity between firms 
in the early period and the fact that firm level stock prices react to changes in 
industrial turbulence supports the cointegration results in Mazzucato (2002) that there 




 The paper began by considering the literature on firm growth rates and the 
“random walk” hypothesis embodied in Gibrat’s Law of Proportionate Growth.  Unit 
root analysis and descriptive statistics on firm-specific growth rates (both absolute 
and relative) in the early auto and PC industry found that the Gibrat hypothesis better 
describes the statistical process of firm growth during the early phase of industry 
evolution.  This is most likely because this early phase is characterized by higher rates 
of entry and exit, rapidly evolving technology and a general expansion of the market 
(creating opportunities for some and disadvantages for others).  Once changes in 
technology and demand settle down and concern shifts more towards economies of 
scale and process innovation, firm growth rates tend to be more stable and structured.  
While one can clearly see these different patterns in the early and mature phase of the 
auto industry (e.g. the unit root hypothesis cannot be rejected for most firms in the 
early phase while it can be rejected in the mature phase), one can only wait for the  
pattern to show up in the PC industry—perhaps not too long given that the industry is 
beginning to experience slower growth and much less product innovation (“Personal 
computer shipments suffer first fall in 15 years”, The Financial Times, July 21/22, 
2001).  
  
The statistical analysis of stock price volatility for firms in both industries 
found that stock prices were most volatile precisely in the decades that relative growth 
rates were most volatile. While in the auto industry this coincides with the period in 
which absolute growth rates were also the most volatile, in the PC industry absolute 
growth rates were most volatile in the first decade (1974-1984) while relative growth 
rates were most volatile in the third decade of industry evolution (the 1990’s). This is 
because in the auto industry the phase of initial market expansion with new firm entry 
and exit (causing volatility in absolute growth rates) was also characterized by radical 
innovation, causing a shake up in market shares during the very early years (Epstein, 
1926).  In the PC industry, the initial phase of expansion and entry was not 
characterized by radical technological change since IBM dominated the growth of the 
industry and the innovation process. Only in the 1990’s—the decade of the “new 
economy”—did innovation become free from IBM’s dominance (due to radical 
changes in processor speed, dominance of the Wintel platform, and the rise of the 
 14
internet), allowing the firms that had entered a decade (at least) before to finally 
compete for market share.   
 
A look at the innovation data (e.g. through the “quality change index”) 
confirms that the periods in which relative growth rates and stock prices were the 
most volatile in both industries were also the periods in which innovation impacted 
the production process the most.  This suggests that both types volatility are related to 
the mechanisms of Schumpetarian creative destruction, or in the words of modern 
strategy theory, to the mechanisms of “competence-destroying” innovations— 
as opposed to “competence enhancing” ones that serve to fortify the advantages of 
incumbents (Tushman and Anderson, 1986).   
 
 An analysis which links volatility in firm growth rates, stock prices and 
innovation provides a different view of the “new economy” and of the stock price 
volatility which has characterized this era (continues today).  Unlike the claim that 
stock prices are driven by “animal spirits” (and other random factors) and that the new 
economy was a period in which stock prices were less related to underlying 
performance criteria due to the greater importance placed by investors on future 
growth potential of firms (due to the characteristics of knowledge underlying the IT 
sector), this analysis had tried to portray how stock price volatility is fundamentally 
linked to the real structure of technological change during industry evolution.  While 
this may not be used for predicting the dynamics of specific stocks (allowing the 
author to become rich), it does provide us with an alternative, Schumpetarian-based, 
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Analysis of the statistical properties of the series (processes) of units produced by  
US and foreign firms: DF and ADF tests  
Firm Sample selected by reference test Test stat. 95% crit. value Process
Chrysler 1925-1941 SBC ADF(1)+drift+t -2.6184 -3.7612 I(1)
1948-1998 SBC DF+drift -3.1572 -2.919 I(0)
Ford 1904-1941 SBC DF+drift -4.0172 -2.9446 I(0)
1925-1941 SBC ADF(1)+drift -3.3364 -3.0522 I(0)
1948-1998 SBC DF+drift -3.3243 -2.919 I(0)
GM 1909-1941 SBC DF+drift -1.6327 -2.9591 I(1)
1925-1941 SBC DF+drift -2.0393 -3.0522 I(1)
1948-1998 SBC DF+drift -3.1688 -2.919 I(0)
Hudson 1910-1926 SBC ADF(1)+drift -3.6729 -3.7612 I(1)
- - - - -
Nash 1917-1926 SBC DF+drift+t -2.1548 -4.1961 I(1)
- - - - -
Packard 1904-1926 SBC DF+drift+t -2.4551 -3.6454 I(1)
- - - - - -
Reo 1905-1928 SBC DF+drift+t -2.3108 -3.6331 I(1)
- - - - -
Studebacker 1911-1941 SBC DF+drift -1.8746 -2.9665 I(1)
1925-1941 SBC DF+drift -1.5779 -3.0522 I(1)
- - - - -
American - - - - - -
- - - - - -
1948-1985 SBC ADF(1)+drift -2.5329 -2.94 I(1)
Total units (US) 1899-1941 SBC ADF(1)+drift -2.3311 -2.9339 I(1)
1925-1941 SBC DF+drift -1.9753 -3.0522 I(1)
1948-1998 SBC DF+drift -4.2927 -2.919 I(0)
Honda 1971-1998 SBC DF+drift -6.7257 -2.9798 I(0)
Mazda 1985-1998 SBC DF+drift -1.2576 -3.1485 I(1)
Mitsubishi 1985-1998 SBC DF+drift -2.6298 -3.1485 I(1)
Nissan 1965-1998 SBC DF+drift -4.9077 -2.9558 I(0)
Toyota 1966-1998 SBC DF+drift+t -6.174 -2.9591 I(0)
Volkswagen 1965-1998 SBC DF+drift -1.4288 -2.9558 I(0)
note: 
DF = Dickey-Fuller Test, drift stands for intercept, t for trend
ADF = Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test, drift stands for intercept, t for trend
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (based on ML)
I(1) = Integrated process of order 1, or Difference Stationary (DS)



























          Descriptive statistics of units (logs of differences) in the US auto industry 
1904-18 1918-28 1918-41 1948-00 1948-70 1970-00 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00
gm st. dev 0.1650 0.1745 0.1548 0.0798 0.0933 0.0732 0.1114 0.0502 0.0229
mean 0.1001 0.0597 0.0579 0.0052 0.0153 -0.0088 -0.0029 -0.0158 -0.0162
ford st. dev 0.2382 0.2734 0.2307 0.0837 0.1045 0.0572 0.0735 0.0683 0.0359
mean 0.1722 0.0011 0.0173 0.0072 0.0283 -0.0103 -0.0277 -0.0054 -0.0161
chrysler st. dev 0.1035 0.1415 0.0897 0.1149 0.0615 0.0717 0.0708 0.0536
mean 0.1019 0.0654 0.0006 0.0130 -0.0089 -0.0210 -0.0090 -0.0155
amc st. dev 0.2039 0.1067 0.1136 0.0913 0.0673 0.1288
mean 0.0971 0.0021 0.0182 -0.0192 -0.0135 -0.0197
studeb st. dev 0.1565 0.1639 0.3023 0.3023
mean 0.0409 0.0470 -0.1038 -0.1038
packard st. dev 0.2096 0.1936
mean 0.1460 0.0262
hudson st. dev 0.2549
mean 0.1178
nash st. dev 0.1784
mean 0.1169
industry st. dev 0.1569 0.1500 0.0638 0.0759 0.0523 0.0768 0.0428 0.0231




















































                     DF-ADF tests for logs of units produced in the US PC industry
Firm Sample selected by reference test Test stat. 95% crit. valueProcess
Apple 1979-2000 SBC DF+drift -7.127 -3.004 I(0)
Hewlett-Pack 1979-2000 SBC ADF(1)+drift+t -2.725 -3.633 I(1)
IBM 1979-2000 SBC ADF(1)+drift -2.101 -3.004 I(1)
NCR 1979-2000 SBC DF+drift+t -0.16 -3.659 I(1)
Unisys 1979-2000 SBC ADF(1)+drift -2.628 -3.012 I(1)
Commodore 1979-1994 SBC DF+drift+t 0.169 -3.735 l(1)
Compaq 1985-2000 SBC DF+drift+t -2.045 -3.735 l(1)
Dell 1987-2000 SBC ADF(1)+drift+t -6.435 -3.792 l(0)
Gateway 1986-2000 SBC ADF(1)+drift -1.586 -3.082 l(1)
Toshiba 1983-2000 SBC DF+drift -1.747 -3.04 l(1)
Wang 1979-1993 SBC DF+drift -1.228 -3.082 l(1)
Wyse 1986-1994 SBC DF+drift+t -1.686 -4.081 l(1)
All firms 1979-2000 SBC DF+drift -3.358 -3.004 I(0)
note: 
DF = Dickey-Fuller Test, drift stands for intercept, t for trend
ADF = Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test, drift stands for intercept, t for trend
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (based on ML)
I(1) = Integrated process of order 1, or Difference Stationary (DS)




















































          Descriptive statistics of units (logs of differences) in the US PC industry 
1970-00 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00
apple st. dev 0.7958 0.6847 0.4118 0.1132
mean 5.7186 4.1964 5.7176 6.2251
compaq st. dev 0.6717 0.3192 0.4843
mean 5.9325 5.3333 6.3406
dell st. dev 0.8999 0.4933 0.6501
mean 5.6426 4.7283 6.0815
everex st. dev 0.2038 0.2768 0.1932
mean 4.7409 4.6979 4.7762
gateway st. dev 1.5397 0.9631 0.5243
mean 4.9947 3.3857 6.0170
hpackard st. dev 1.1976 0.4852 0.3910 0.7145
mean 4.7415 3.2614 4.8468 5.8018
ibm st. dev 1.3390 0.4552 0.8164 0.1464
mean 5.3104 3.3484 5.6838 6.3037
nec st. dev 0.3437 0.3437
mean 6.1557 6.1557
toshiba st. dev 1.1964 1.0799 0.3587
mean 4.9549 4.0701 5.7926
unisys st. dev 0.6569 0.3242 0.4711 0.6040
mean 4.1503 3.3528 4.3014 4.4822
industry st. dev 0.1758 0.2062 0.1884 0.0357















Analysis of the statistical properties of the series (processes) of the real stock prices (logs) 
by US firms: DF and ADF tests  
Firm Sample selected by reference test Test stat. 95% crit. value Process
Chrysler 1925-1941 SBC DF+drift -1.6451 -3.0819 I(1)
1948-1997 SBC DF+drift -1.2896 -2.9202 I(1)
Ford - - - - - -
- - - - - -
1956-1998 SBC DF+drift -1.0184 -2.9339 I(1)
GM 1918-1941 SBC DF+drift -1.85 -3.0039 I(1)
1925-1941 SBC DF+drift -1.4806 -3.0522 I(1)
1948-1998 SBC DF+drift -1.5644 -2.919 I(1)
Hudson 1922-1941 SBC DF+drift+t -2.4929 -3.6921 I(1)
1925-1941 SBC ADF(1)+drift+t -3.747 -3.7119 I(0)
- - - - - -
Nash 1922-1941 SBC DF+drift+t -4.2651 -3.6921 I(0)
1925-1941 SBC DF+drift+t -3.9201 -3.7119 I(0)
- - - - - -
Packard 1917-1941 SBC ADF(1)+drift+t -5.1512 -3.6592 I(0)
1925-1941 SBC ADF(1)+drift+t -4.7759 -3.7119 I(0)
- - - - - -
Studeback 1920-1941 SBC ADF(1)+drift -3.516 -3.0199 I(0)
1925-1941 SBC ADF(1)+drift -3.2718 -3.0522 I(0)
1948-1966 SBC DF+drift -2.2482 -3.0294 I(1)
American - - - - - -
- - - - - -
1954-1986 SBC ADF(1)+drift+t -2.9128 -3.5615 I(1)
Industry 1918-1941 SBC DF+drift -1.4876 -3.0039 I(1)
1925-1941 SBC DF+drift -2.8846 -3.0522 I(1)
1948-1998 SBC ADF(1)+drift -2.181 -2.919 I(1)
S&P500 1913-1941 SBC DF+drift -2.3482 -2.975 I(1)
1925-1941 SBC ADF(1)+drift -3.0079 -3.0522 I(1)
1948-1998 SBC DF+drift -0.083576 -2.919 I(1)
note: 
DF = Dickey-Fuller Test, drift stands for intercept, t for trend
ADF = Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test, drift stands for intercept, t for trend
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (based on ML)
I(1) = Integrated process of order 1, or Difference Stationary (DS)




















































          Descriptive statistics of stock prices (logs of differences) in the US auto industry 
1918-28 1918-41 1948-00 1948-70 1970-2000 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000
gm st. dev 0.170964 0.147147 0.095173 0.080395 0.107536 0.096764 0.147021 0.038757
mean 0.055331 0.043339 0.006101 -0.000395 0.00716 -0.017501 0.016151 0.01551
ford st. dev 0.107571 0.08662 0.116013 0.125156 0.096478 0.128755
mean 0.006197 0.008201 0.004956 -0.040533 -0.000331 0.036639
chrysler st. dev 0.469634 0.248602 0.14847 0.08969 0.187895 0.154917 0.215675 0.185247
mean -0.080296 -0.000182 -0.001796 -0.016302 0.001725 -0.084603 0.03748 0.018132
amc st. dev 0.170042 0.19818 0.13688 0.092815 0.188094
mean -0.001156 0.020099 -0.027492 -0.020019 -0.038167
studeb st. dev 0.206597 0.195977 0.280321 0.280321
mean -0.006913 -0.007087 0.011368 0.011368
packard st. dev 0.223114 0.187234 0.107029 0.107029
mean 0.057746 0.011162 -0.041811 -0.041811
hudson st. dev 0.200407 0.186195 0.098529 0.098529
mean 0.095105 0.010527 -0.01907 -0.01907
nash st. dev 0.390304 0.316962
mean 0.028112 0.017133
industry st. dev 0.145861 0.139372 0.079111 0.067126 0.088107 0.08955 0.088704 0.081875
mean 0.093952 0.062004 0.029882 0.033595 0.024391 -0.019957 0.030865 0.045813
auto stock prices divided by the S&P500 stock price 
1918-28 1918-41 1948-00 1948-70 1970-00 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00
gm st. dev 0.213194 0.172266 0.05879 0.066352 0.051239 0.044026 0.072389 0.02192
mean 0.003571 0.002638 -0.01278 -0.02173 -0.00648 -0.00982 -0.00759 -0.00803
ford st. dev 0.050352 0.046057 0.052478 0.063024 0.052042 0.045389
mean -0.0074 -0.00587 -0.00717 -0.02108 -0.0123 0.001149
chrysler st. dev 0.444806 0.243829 0.065299 0.040836 0.079745 0.064677 0.097673 0.073517
mean -0.18241 -0.05268 -0.01673 -0.0318 -0.00736 -0.04255 0.007565 -0.00414
amc st. dev 0.095735 0.120111 0.064283 0.042164 0.088971
mean -0.00584 0.00264 -0.01593 -0.01062 -0.02475
studeb st. dev 0.207561 0.167586 0.18901 0.18901
mean -0.04401 -0.03154 -0.01761 -0.01761
packard st. dev 0.187661 0.145828 0.07082 0.07082
mean 0.020267 -0.01436 -0.04794 -0.04794
hudson st. dev 0.188132 0.130295 0.079557 0.079557
mean -0.0045 -0.0456 -0.0423 -0.0423
nash st. dev 0.392557 0.312088
mean -0.08453 -0.10006
industry st. dev 0.125784 0.108988 0.035248 0.037218 0.033578 0.040372 0.038819 0.027427




















































             DF-ADF tests for the logs of real stock prices in the US PC industry 
Firm Sample selected by reference test Test stat. 95% crit. valueProcess
Apple 1983-2000 SBC DF+drift -2.333 -3.04 I(1)
Hewlett-Pack 1979-2000 - - - - -
IBM 1979-2000 SBC ADF(1)+drift -1.822 -3.003 I(1)
NCR 1979-2000 - - - - -
Unisys 1979-2000 SBC ADF(1)+drift+t -3.855 -3.633 I(0)
Commodore 1979-1993 SBC DF+drift -2.071 -3.081 I(1)
Compaq 1985-2000 SBC DF+drift -2.117 -3.066 I(1)
Dell 1990-2000 SBC DF+drift+t -1.746 -3.927 I(1)
Gateway 1995-2000 SBC DF+drift+t -4.683 -4.581 I(0)
Toshiba 1992-1997 SBC ADF(1)+drift -1.498 -3.551 I(1)
Wang 1979-1998 SBC DF+drift -2.613 -3.019 I(1)
Wyse 1986-1988 SBC DF+drift -0.393 -4.706 I(1)
note: 
DF = Dickey-Fuller Test, drift stands for intercept, t for trend
ADF = Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test, drift stands for intercept, t for trend
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (based on ML)
I(1) = Integrated process of order 1, or Difference Stationary (DS)




















































Descriptive statistics of stock prices (logs of differences) in the US PC Industry 
stock prices divided by the S&P 500
1970-00 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00 1970-00 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00
apple st. dev 0.209303 0.238666 0.19128 0.083065 0.09724 0.073131
mean 0.043676 0.064494 0.005768 0.009145 0.020582 -0.00922
compaq st. dev 0.225305 0.230429 0.218546 0.089324 0.099345 0.078982
mean 0.091429 0.135991 0.068572 0.032226 0.057387 0.018271
dell st. dev 0.370061 0.694571 0.350854 0.138582 0.281417 0.131854
mean 0.201428 0.190106 0.247106 0.072183 0.086022 0.089015
everex st. dev 0.239683 0.296755 0.104951 0.09334 0.117415 0.034097
mean -0.129761 -0.052906 -0.199099 -0.05629 -0.02735 -0.08481
gateway st. dev 0.337883 0.337883 0.107928 0.107928
mean 0.080564 0.080564 0.019431 0.019431
hpackardst. dev 0.132265 0.134861 0.135744 0.150659 0.059641 0.070197 0.061558 0.063048
mean 0.043979 0.025972 -0.000603 0.081044 0.011006 0.013164 -0.0052 0.019333
ibm st. dev 0.122494 0.098844 0.103189 0.147733 0.054581 0.053856 0.056612 0.052748
mean 0.027457 0.005942 0.022224 0.050709 0.001435 0.004051 -0.00277 0.004831
nec st. dev 0.265431 0.307358 0.295656 0.171236 0.123413 0.152363 0.140936 0.056444
mean 0.050035 0.275437 0.019097 0.007448 0.015864 0.1347 -0.00042 -0.00681
toshiba st. dev 0.298498 0.298498 0.119026 0.119026
mean 0.077906 0.077906 0.02701 0.02701
unisys st. dev 0.237456 0.090132 0.262856 0.353007 0.093811 0.054849 0.108797 0.133124
mean -0.013906 -0.040914 -0.092654 -0.000323 -0.01384 -0.01852 -0.05017 -0.00969
industry st. dev 0.090528 0.070891 0.066299 0.119646 0.034966 0.029413 0.032475 0.044552




















































Analysis of the statistical properties of the series (processes) of the real dividends (logs) 
by US firms: DF and ADF tests  
Firm Sample selected by reference test Test stat. 95% crit. value Process
Chrysler 1925-1941 SBC DF+drift -1.5616 -3.0819 I(1)
1948-1997 SBC DF+drift+t -3.0655 -3.5005 I(1)
Ford - - - - - -
- - - - - -
1956-1998 SBC DF+drift+t -3.1455 -3.5217 I(1)
GM 1918-1941 SBC DF+drift -4.368 -3.0039 I(0)
1925-1941 SBC DF+drift -3.5828 -3.0522 I(1)
1948-1998 SBC DF+drift+t -4.1592 -3.4987 I(0)
Hudson 1922-1941 SBC ADF(1)+drift+t -2.0859 -3.6921 I(1)
1925-1941 SBC ADF(1)+drift+t -2.9512 -3.7119 I(1)
- - - - - -
Nash 1918-1941 SBC DF+drift+t -2.1926 -3.6921 I(1)
1925-1941 SBC DF+drift+t -1.8594 -3.8731 I(1)
- - - - - -
Packard 1917-1941 SBC ADF(1)+drift -2.6589 -2.997 I(1)
1925-1941 SBC DF+drift -2.0046 -3.0522 I(1)
- - - - - -
Studeback 1920-1941 SBC DF+drift+t -2.6264 -3.6746 I(1)
1925-1941 SBC DF+drift+t -2.5698 -3.7119 I(1)
1948-1966 SBC
note: 
DF = Dickey-Fuller Test, drift stands for intercept, t for trend
ADF = Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test, drift stands for intercept, t for trend
SBC = Schwarz Bayesian Criterion (based on ML)
I(1) = Integrated process of order 1, or Difference Stationary (DS)









          Descriptive statistics of dividends (logs of differences) in the US auto industry 
gm ford chrysler studeb packard hudson nash industry
1918-1928
mean 0.014397 0.110924 -0.023247 0.066026 0.013197 0.028383
sd 0.482548 0.019819 0.536553 0.467959 0.248424 0.323424
1918-1941
mean 0.033447 0.076592 -0.013561 0.042445 0.037086 0.013197 0.033497
sd 0.390041 0.293965 0.454954 0.421882 0.605477 0.248424 0.260793
1948-2000
mean -0.009355 -1.35E-18 -0.007187 0.117701 0.174293 0.0546 -0.008183
sd 0.236352 0.183059 0.283631 0.41256 0.501824 0.316417 0.166783
1948-1970
mean 0.002363 -0.001266 -0.024958 0.117701 0.174293 0.0546 0.000777
sd 0.217482 0.115859 0.302836 0.41256 0.501824 0.316417 0.166347
1970-2000
mean -0.018327 0.000633 -0.011149 -0.021017
sd 0.249796 0.2078 0.284339 0.169351
1970-1980
mean -0.013752 0.027978 -0.027366 -0.00438
sd 0.17152 0.121243 0.415832 0.135948
1980-1990
mean 0.02803 0.02128 0.070741 0.040017
sd 0.300927 0.276309 0.253263 0.141594
1990-2000
mean -0.039131 -0.045216 -0.008671 -0.066232
sd 0.300438 0.185551 0.163264 0.238726
dividends divided by S&P500 dividends
gm ford chrysler studeb packard hudson nash industry
1918-1928
mean -0.20397 -2.97376 0.002687 -0.38466 -1.85289 -1.43912 -0.53587
sd 1.970619 1.351719 2.158434 1.807524 1.927482 2.179365 1.351978
1918-1941
mean -0.24482 -1.03621 1.1693 0.554859 -1.85289 -1.12314 -0.14841
sd 1.783283 3.996167 3.064914 2.807317 1.927482 1.935122 2.216052
1948-2000
mean 0.038245 0.021935 0.153166 -1.55441 -2.30179 -0.75077 -0.08632
sd 3.860647 0.260755 2.010349 8.667584 31.47605 2.343213 1.120368
1948-1970
mean 0.137328 0.064747 0.280318 -1.55441 -2.30179 -0.75077 -0.1759
sd 6.268709 0.309609 2.877157 8.667584 31.47605 2.343213 1.672397
1970-2000
mean -0.02449 0.001267 -0.01519 -0.02433
sd 0.291131 0.233028 0.459053 0.189174
1970-1980
mean -0.03281 0.036619 -0.05477 -0.01699
sd 0.305296 0.171906 0.654712 0.218123
1980-1990
mean 0.019654 0.010679 0.179367 0.04059
sd 0.324001 0.311346 0.371452 0.165079
1990-2000
mean -0.0331 -0.04334 -0.00831 -0.05725















Descriptive statistics for logs of real dividends in the US PC industry 
Firm Market Sample selected by reference test Test stat. 95% crit. valueProcess
Apple US 1989-1996 SBC DF+drift+t 0.856 -4.196 I(1)
Hewlett-Pack US 1979-2000 SBC DF+drift+t -2.016 -3.633 I(1)
IBM US 1979-2000 SBC ADF1+drift+t -2.54 -3.633 I(1)
NCR US 1979-1991 SBC DF+drift+t -4.571 -3.828 I(0)
Unisys US 1979-1990 SBC DF+drift+t -1.304 -3.873 I(1)
Wang US 1979-1989 SBC DF+drift -2.876 -3.18 I(1)
Wyse US 1979-2000 - - - - -
DF-ADF tests for E/S by firm
Apple US 1980-2000 SBC ADF(1)+drift -3.498 -3.011 I(0)
Hewlett-Pack US 1979-2000 SBC DF+drift 1.905 -3.004 I(1)
IBM US 1979-2000 SBC ADF(1)+drift -2.195 -3.004 I(1)
NCR US 1979-2000 SBC ADF(1)+drift+t -2.505 -3.633 I(1)
Unisys US 1979-2000 SBC DF+drift -3.618 -3.004 I(0)
Commodore US 1979-1993 SBC ADF(1)+drift -2.46 -3.082 I(1)
Compaq US 1983-2000 SBC DF+drift -4.611 -3.04 I(0)
Dell US 1987-2000 SBC DF+drift+t 0.815 -3.792 I(1)
Gateway US 1992-2000 SBC ADF(1)+drift+t -4.993 -4.081 I(0)
Toshiba US 1979-2000 SBC DF+drift -3.354 -3.004 I(0)
Wang US 1979-1998 SBC DF+drift+t -2.613 -3.659 I(1)




















































Descriptive statistics of dividends (logs of differences) in the US PC Industry 
dividends divided by the S&P 500 dividend 
1970-00 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00 1970-00 1970-80 1980-90 1990-00
apple st. dev 0.263737 0.20787 0.233295 0.2505 0.2272 0.1972
mean 0 0.18809 -0.074697 0.0279 0.2286 -0.0531
compaq st. dev 0.367919 0.367919 0.3147 0.3147
mean 0.376664 0.376664 0.3283 0.3283
hpackard st. dev 0.078744 0.05656 0.101334 0.040454 0.1401 0.1227 0.1166 0.0387
mean 0.066423 0.08854 0.033962 0.085194 0.1460 0.3103 0.0926 0.0886
ibm st. dev 0.116946 0.03359 0.017298 0.177071 0.1255 0.0739 0.0193 0.1613
mean 0.008652 0.06962 0.013481 -0.040089 0.0299 0.1375 0.0149 -0.0338
nec st. dev 0.159784 0.03196 0.232574 0.056952 0.2020 0.0883 0.2796 0.0488
mean -0.003193 0.05077 -0.017321 -0.00702 0.0436 0.1812 0.0198 0.0107
toshiba st. dev 0.080092 0.08009 0.1226 0.1226
mean 0.047025 0.04702 0.0756 0.0756
unisys st. dev 0.125461 0.11623 0.09945 0.1868 0.1933 0.0975
mean 0.03501 0.11917 -0.013284 0.0833 0.2308 -0.0065
industry st. dev 0.1107 0.0663 0.0364 0.1689 0.1161 0.1024 0.0425 0.1524

























1918-1928 22.6 0.1569 0.1458 0.3234 0.1257 1.3520
0.0304 0.0939 0.0283 0.0617 -0.5536
1918-1941 17.9 0.1500 0.1393 0.2608 0.1089 2.2161
0.0378 0.0620 0.0334 0.0352 -0.1484
1948-2000 7.6 0.0638 0.0791 0.1668 0.0352 0.9974
0.0070 0.0298 -0.0881 -0.0020 -0.0863
1948-1970 10.3 0.0759 0.0671 0.1663 0.0372 1.5054
0.0171 0.0335 0.0007 0.0002 -0.1759
1970-2000 5.6 0.0523 0.0881 0.1694 0.0335 0.1772
-0.0030 0.0243 -0.0210 -0.0036 -0.0243
PC
1970-1980 1.4 0.2062 0.0708 0.0663 0.0294 0.1024
0.2431 -0.0047 0.0567 -0.0039 -0.0663
1980-1990 11.5 0.1884 0.0662 0.0364 0.0324 0.0425
0.1450 0.0154 0.0137 -0.0136 -0.0096
1990-2000 17.9 0.0357 0.1196 0.1689 0.0445 0.1524
0.0646 0.0585 -0.0410 -0.0003 -0.0043
1970-2000 28.9 0.1758 0.0905 0.1107 0.0349 0.1166
0.1504 0.0258 0.0091 -0.0038 0.0041
italics=mean value 
bold number=highest decade
MS Inst.= instability index from Eq. (1)
Units=standard deviation and mean of units produced
Stock=standard deviation and mean of industry-level stock price
Dividend=standard deviation and mean of industry-level dividend
Stck/SP500= industry-level stock price divided by S&P500 stock price 




















































 Auto industry 1927-1951
Restricted SURE estimates (ML estimates for the Fixed Effect Panel) 
Homogeneity restrictions for all the coefficients (variables in logs of first differences)
int StPrSP500 Div Div SP500 MktSh Nfirms Herf
Chrysler 0.097211 - - - - - -
t-value 1.802
Gen. Motors 0.029421 - - - - - -
t-value 0.36932
Studebaker 0.092913 - - - - - -
t-value 0.34865
Hudson -0.012132 - - - - - -
t-value -0.13587
Packard -0.048739 - - - - - -
t-value -0.11418
FE Panel 0.0317348 1.1901 0.22154 -0.75814 1.6945 0.10523 -2.5164
t-value 0.453984 6.7143 7.8966 -3.5449 4.3548 0.29019 -8.4993
Wald-test for Homog restr (1) 1.28E+11
Wald-test for Homog restr (2) 31.7782 8.01E+10 105.6889 2.28E+09 165.1449 3.53E+01
ML -23.3301
SBC -38.2243
Note: Wald Homogeneity restriction test (1): Homogeneity restrictions (equality) for the firm-level coefficients of all the regressors





















































Restricted SURE estimates (ML estimate for the Fixed Effect Panel) 
Homogeneity restrictions for all the coefficients (variables in logs of first differences)
int StPrSP500 Div Div SP500 MktSh Nfirms Herf
Chrysler -0.071372 - - - - - -
t-value -1.406
Gen.Motors -0.042365 - - - - - -
t-value -1.316
Ford -0.063612 - - - - - -
t-value -1.8497
FE Panel -0.05911633 0.94722 0.061502 0.0043001 0.50341 0.11348 0.26794
t-value -1.5239 5.0049 2.2092 0.18261 0.70544 0.2642 0.75981
Wald-test for Homog restr (1) 11,5370**
Wald-test for Homog restr (2) 0,70006** 4,9081* 2,6299** 1,4789** 0,21925** 2,3759**
ML 7.7857
SBC -8.9254
Note: Wald Homogeneity restriction test (1): Homogeneity restrictions (equality) for the firm-level coefficients of all the regressors





















































Restricted SURE estimates (ML estimate for the Fixed Effect Panel) 
Homogeneity restrictions for all the coefficients (variables in logs of first differences)
int StPrSP500 StPrIND dldivIND Pr/Earn MktSh Nfirms Herf
Apple 0.050832 - - - - - - -
t-value 0.48397
H-P 0.062499 - - - - - - -
t-value 1.0608
IBM 0.032559 - - - - - - -
t-value 0.58648
NCR 0.10719 - - - - - - -
t-value 1.7181
Unysis -0.018619 - - - - - - -
t-value -0.13622
Panel 0.0468922 -0.36311 0.66459 -0.25689 0.063212 -0.083297 1.0726 -0.143
t-value 0.742626 -1.963 7.091 -4.0585 2.3336 -1.8048 1.1707 -2.0388
Wald-test for Homog restr (1) 1.73E+10
Wald-test for Homog restr (2) 8,3355* 362.8003 10.7475 142.7652 170.9432 1.73E+10 9.9136
ML -9.1565
SBC -26.4987
Note: Wald Homogeneity restriction test (1): Homogeneity restrictions (equality) for the firm-level coefficients of all the regressors
Note: Wald Homogeneity restriction test (2): Homogeneity restrictions (equality) for the firm-level coefficients of the single variables
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Notes 
                                                     
i The firms used to create the S&P index for automobiles are (dates in parentheses are 
the beginning and end dates): Chrysler (12-18-25), Ford Motor (8-29-56), General 
Motors  (1-2-18), American Motors (5-5-54 to 8-5-87), Auburn Automobile (12-31-
25 to 5-4-38), Chandler-Cleveland (1-2-18 to 12-28-25), Hudson Motor Car (12-31-
25 to  4-28-54), Hupp Motor Car (1-2-18 to 1-17-40), Nash-Kelvinator Corp (12-31-
25 to  4-28-54), Packard Motor Car (1-7-20 to 9-29-54), Pierce-Arrow (1-2-18 to 12-
28-25), Reo Motor Car (12-31-25 to 1-17-40), Studebaker Corp. (10-6-54 to 4-22-64), 
White Motor (1-2-18 to 11-2-32), and Willy’s Overland (1-2-18 to 3-29-33). 
 
ii  Since in the post-war period, the results were not sensitive to whether we used the 
aggregate industry data (provided by S&P) or the average of the firm-specific one, 
this suggests that the pre-war data is robust.  
 
iii The computer industry was first labelled by S&P as Computer Systems and then in 
1996 changed to Computer Hardware. Firms included in this index are:  
Apple Computer (4-11-84), COMPAQ Computer (2-4-88), Dell Computer (9-5-96), 
Gateway, Inc. (4-24-98), Hewlett-Packard (6-4-95), IBM (1-12-19), Silicon Graphics 
(1-17-95), and Sun Microsystems (8-19-92).  
 
iv Recent empirical studies have suggested that the best simple generalization is that, 
on average, smaller firms have a lower probability of survival, but those that survive 
grow proportionately faster than large firms.  The real problem lies not in 
characterizing what happens on average but the fact that a wide range of different 
patterns occurs across different markets, so that it is difficult to generalize as to the 
normal size-growth relationship or the ‘typical’ shape of the distribution.  
 







it ssI ,  where  its = the market share of firm i at time t. 
 
vi In the 1980’s IBM focussed on incremental technical change with backward 
compatibility: all other firms’ hardware and software products had to work with IBM 
equipment.  IBM’s power first came under threat when the Intel 80386 chip was used 
by Compaq’s new computer, so that the computer was marketed for the quality of the 
chip not the IBM compatibility. Once the “industry standard” label became more 
important than the “IBM compatible” label, IBM became much weaker.  The next 
shakeup to the power structure came when IBM split with Microsoft over operating 
systems in 1990.  The industry standard now changed to the “Wintel” standard, 
finishing off what remained of IBM’s special status. Another reason why the 1990’s 
presented such disruptive change was due to the development of the new 
“client/server” platform (networked platform with highly intelligent terminals).  This 
new platform was based on a vertically disintegrated structure which devalued 
traditional management causing the strengths of the incumbents (mainly IBM and 
DEC) to become obsolete (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1997). The tradition of 
backward compatibility made the incumbent platforms particularly hard to change in 
reaction to the users’ new needs. 
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vii The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) measures idiosyncratic risk through the 
covariance between the firm-level (or industry-level) stock return and the market-
level stock return: the lower is this covariance the higher is the unsystematic or 
idiosyncratic level of risk.  Through cointegration analysis, Mazzucato (2002) finds 
that this idiosyncratic risk is higher in the early phase of the industry life-cycle.  
